Self-Communication in Severed Minds: Perspectives from Neuroscience, Psychology, and Philosophy

In its exploration of memory and selfhood, Severance draws on core debates within neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. This chapter features examples from Severance to bring these debates to life. I present evidence that the brain includes modules that are encapsulated (i.e., cannot communicate), much like we might surmise from a cursory analysis of severed minds, but then argue that while some memory types are encapsulated for innies and outies, others communicate between personas. I also discuss how memory changes over time (memory consolidation) and consider the relationship between memory and emotion, highlighting parallels within Severance. Finally, I survey philosophical literature, considering competing accounts of the self—A collection of fleeting parts? A persistent unified whole?—and pinpoint similar arguments articulated by Severance characters. In bringing together insights from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and fiction, I hope to provide a richly integrated tapestry of ideas about the complexity of the human experience.