Spatial Representational Theories of Visual Perception

In this paper I argue that it is not just the distal objects of visual perception which are spatial in character but also the visual percepts per se which “represent” those objects. I begin the paper by both distinguishing among and critically examining the relative merits of several versions of theories holding that visual perception is representional in character. I review a variety of different senses of “representation” and characterizing visual perception theories invoking two of these senses; a conceptual sense and a spatial sense. I also briefly discuss the non-representational account of visual perception given by naïve realism. I then critically examine the relative merits of these theories. I claim that two of the theories—naïve realism and conceptual versions of representationalism—involve fundamental confusions. Instead of either of these, I opt for a spatial version of a representational account, which I term “spatial representational realism,” whereby it is held that events in a phenomenal space and time are both caused by and, to a limited extent, mirror the spatial and temporal structure of corresponding events in physical space and time. Finally, I address some linguistic and epistemological implications of my account.