Conceptions of Criticality

Scholars approach the nature of thinking in different ways. My starting point is that we do not need to propose an exhaustive definition of thinking (or critical thinking or of criticality). I touch upon reflections from Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin. I talk about concepts and conceptions using ideas from Miranda Fricker, John Rawls and H. L. A. Hart. The discussion then shifts to specific conceptions advanced by Robert Ennis, John McPeck, Richard Paul and Harvey Siegel. I argue that some scholars manifest a craving for generality at the expense of catering for alternative perspectives; and that their focus appears more on the logical or formal aspects of criticality and less on the social, political and cultural environment in which critical beings think and act. I contend, taking Emma Williams’ cue, that some of them succumb to the allure of rationalism and generate rationalistic conceptions of criticality that do not necessarily do justice to how the human being thinks. Borrowing from Martin Davies and Ronald Barnett, I underline the importance of the epistemological and ontological features of criticality given my focus is on being and acting as well as thinking.