Conclusion
摘要
Schuster criticized Descartes’ method, which he interpreted as a unique, universal, transferable and efficacious general method of discovery and/or justification for rational disciplines. The accumulation of such absolutist attributes makes Descartes’ method untenable. However, when these attributes are understood as manifestations of the enthusiasm that naturally accompanies every discovery, they can be relativized. Thus, unique can be understood as exceptional, universal can be understood as broadly applicable, transferable can be interpreted as transferable to adjacent fields, and general can be understood as more general than the common practices of the time. These relativized attributes were shifted by Schuster’s description into the realm of ideological blindness and demagogy. Descartes had many reasons to be enthusiastic about his method. His analytic method was indeed exceptional, it opened possibilities for further discovery, and it was transferable to various disciplines, beginning with geometry, where it proved its efficacy. Therefore, rather than debunking the absolutist caricature of Descartes’ method, it is more interesting to try to understand its working core and to reconstruct its development.