Summary and Conclusions

This study provided a comparative analysis of the minimal self and the unconscious. At first sight, such a comparison is a nonstarter, since the formal definition of the minimal self alludes to the self-givenness of experiences and the phenomenal character of what-it-is-like-for-me-ness. That is, the minimal self is restricted to self-illuminating intentional states and attempts to avoid the Scylla of the nonconscious mental states and the Charybdis of the unconscious. However, as Zahavi himself has shown in his replies to critics, the minimal self can be understood in at least in two ways: first, the formal definition refers to the basic distinction between our own and others’ mental states; second, the minimal self is also an experiential core self and the target property of psychopathological investigations. I have therefore tried to show that it is incumbent upon any theory of the minimal self to distinguish between the strictly phenomenological and psychopathological utilizations of the term.