Immediacy as Philosophical Problem in Adam Smith’s Moral Theory

This chapter demonstrates the importance of immediacy as a philosophical problem for understanding Smith’s conception of the human being and Smith’s model of the mind. First, I argue that imagination underlies the possibility of harmony between oneself and others and the moral, cognitive and perceptual experience of others. I analyse the concept of ‘imagination’, showing how natural aspects in terms of perception have an immediate moral connotation in terms of morality, thanks to two conceptual devices: ‘perception’ and ‘aesthetics’. I then show the link between pleasure and moral displeasure and physical pleasure or pain in order to: (1) link the natural dimension of imagination (perception and sympathy) to the moral context of conscious and responsible control over the expression of certain natural passions in society; (2) underline the importance for Smith of the desire to be deservedly approved and the centrality for the human being of the corresponding pleasure that derives from it. Then, I consider the psychological origin of the self in Smith’s philosophy and I explore what prudence and impartiality mean for Smith. Starting from the idea that a person judges as his own what he can naturally sympathise with, I focus on Smith’s investigation of the principle of approbation the character and conduct of an ordinary human being. I argue, therefore, that for Smith, the principle of approbation would be based on the immediate sympathy of the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator is the perspective from which a human being strives to judge and think impartially as a spectator, without fully identifying themselves with their passions or emotions, accepting without reducing to a single part the coexistence of passion and reason, nature and morality, unintentional and conscious aspects.