A Semantic Overview of ‘Nature’ and ‘Natural’ in Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy

This chapter aims to provide an overview of the meaning of the terms ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ as used by Smith in his moral philosophy in relation to human nature. Starting from a synthesis of a number of perspectives, as opposed to those that see nature unilaterally as an object of description or as a matrix of moral norms, I show in what sense nature could be a normative object amenable to description in Smith’s moral philosophy. In particular, I describe the possibility of considering the relationship between nature and morality in a non-unilateral way. In doing so, I show how, for Smith, nature can express itself through morality; sometimes nature itself can be moral; or morality can express itself naturally or directly; at other times, differently, morality seems to correct aspects of nature. Within this framework, I emphasise that Smith does not reduce morality to what is natural in relation to the divine will or God. Rather, for Smith, the limits of descriptive knowledge of a normative nature open up the field of possibility for a different understanding of human beings in moral terms.