Counterinsurgency Versus Counterterrorism and Beyond: What Is Suitable for the Sahel?

This chapter aims to nuance our understanding about the differences between the theoretical problems of counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN), as the line between the two concepts is getting blurred. This is partially due to some political restraints, which in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have undoubtedly become part of the equation, but these restraints are poorly understood. Also, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency require different skillsets, force structure, and can lead to different outcomes. The complex problems of political ambiguities in the host nation, those of the outside actors who are supporting these host nations, as well as the limitations of the CT and COIN approaches need to be understood in order to form a realistic strategy for containing the conflicts in the Sahel countries. In order to get a better understanding of the nature of the conflict in the Sahel, this chapter will provide a short overview of the regional dynamics of violent non-state actor activity, focusing on Mali and its regional role, provide a theoretical framework for a better understanding of the problems involving counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. What Western nations are undertaking in the Sahel, in the view of the author, is not covered by either our classical understanding of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, and this brings its own political ambiguities and problems. The chapter will argue that the structure of conflict has changed since the Cold War, and this coupled with technological and other developments caused a new political context for the use of force abroad against non-state armed actors, generating new, poorly understood political limitations. Thus, it is a necessity to introduce the third-party theory for the understanding of the political limitations of outside state actors in such conflicts.