Epistemic Models of DD: Reasoning and Judging in an Epistemically Correct Way

The epistemic turn in deliberative democracy has led to a re-evaluation of the search for the truth as the ultimate aim of public deliberation. This search for the truth is not confined to metatheoretical debates emphasising the relevance of discussion over voting, but also questions the role of popular participation promoted by the deliberative turn itself (as discussed in Chap. 4 ). This chapter critically assesses the types of epistemic justification sought by several thinkers committed to identifying either which democratic practices are more conducive to right decisions, or which types of reasoning processes are deemed to be inconsistent with the requirements of public reason. The starting point is Estlund’s (1997, 2003, 2008) attempt to arrive at a procedural justification of DD alternative to those suggested by both radical deliberative democrats on one side, and epistocrats on the other side. Following Estlund, several other philosophers have insisted on separating justification and legitimacy, making the search for external standards and criteria of validity a necessary precondition for attributing legitimacy to public decisions (Landemore, 2012, 2020; Misak, 2000, 2009; Peter, 2009, 2013; Talisse, 2005, 2009). To them must also be added several authors employing the Rawlsian notion of public reason to discern which doctrines/approaches can be part of an overlapping consensus, and which are beyond its bounds (Farrelly, 2007; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004; Laden, 2001). The chapter pursues two main goals. First, the theoretical arguments employed to show the inconsistencies affecting non-epistemic conceptions of DD are discussed and reassessed. Second, the more substantive elements of the epistemic readings of DD are critically scrutinised and evaluated. The conclusion supported in this chapter is that epistemic conceptions of DD are not only deeply problematic on their own terms, but they are to a large extent also politically counter-productive. While they are unable to suggest positive epistemic criteria that can track the correct courses of action, their anti-political stance and critical view of popular participation inevitably question the legitimacy of the democratic experimentation promoted so far, and are likely to have a negative, demotivating effect on the participatory spirit of those involved in it.