The Mind, Embodiment and Technology: Experience, Aesthetic Sensibility and Production of Meaning

One of the hottest topics of current debate are so-called intelligent technologies. Apart from the development and application of these technologies in almost all dimensions of life, there is a heated debate in philosophy and cognitive science about the possibility of general Artificial Intelligence, that is, the possibility of such artificial systems becoming conscious and acquiring the same cognitive capacities as human beings. In this chapter, I will argue that such predictions cannot be realized unless the artificial systems have organic bodies and aesthetic sensibilities, which make it possible to have experience and produce meaning in ways similar to human beings. After looking briefly at the present-day dominant model of mind, I will look at the concepts of experience, aesthetic sensibility and production of meaning through the lens of John Dewey’s work and the work of the philosopher Mark Johnson, influenced by his thought. This analysis shows why artificial systems and “intelligent” technologies are not capable of aesthetic sensibility, and that they cannot be producers of meaning and, therefore, subjects of experience.