Too Little, but Not Too Late? Assessing the Role of Sanctions in the EU’s Rule of Law Conflict with Poland

Until recently, the European Union (EU) has been unable to stop democratic backsliding in one of its biggest member states, Poland. Academic evaluations attribute the ineffectiveness of internal EU sanctions mostly to internal shortcomings, such as institutional gridlock and intergovernmental resistance. In the 2020s, the EU introduced new mechanisms, such as Rule of Law conditionality and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). This chapter examines the effectiveness of pre-existing and newly introduced mechanisms utilized in the ‘rule of law’ conflict between the EU and Poland. Our analysis shows that financial conditionality mechanisms were more effective than other sanctions, such as infringement or Article 7 procedures. At the same time, the Polish PiS government was able to block the efficacy of other new mechanisms, such as the EPPO. Contrary to some expectations, internal EU sanctions also did not lead to a ‘rally around the flag’ effect in Poland.