Interaction Attacks as Deceitful Connected and Automated Vehicle Behavior
摘要
The present chapter aims at exploring the idea of interaction attacks as a form of deceitful connected and automated vehicle (CAV) behavior that requires to be counteracted both on the technical and social levels. After some introductory remarks on cyberattacks, deception, and driving automation, we argue that interaction attacks and related risks still require to be adequately conceptualized. To this aim, we draw on Norbert Wiener’s notes on animals and cybernetic systems to show that the possibility of interaction attacks based on deceptive behavior stems from the very nature of control in machines. Using Wiener’s insights and recent literature as a blueprint, we then provide a conceptual description of interaction attacks involving CAVs. In addition, we discuss a case study aimed at further clarifying the phenomenon. Finally, we advance some remarks on interaction attacks as a form of deceitful CAV behavior according to the framework elaborated by (Nikitas et al., Transp Policy 122: 1–10, 2022) and call for further research on such a critical issue.