The constitutive nature of language—and so literature—is best accounted for through appreciation of both the attitudinal realm and language’s inescapable enabling activity as it creates modes of relating. Both ideas position language as intimately bound up not just with living, but with engaging, appreciating, exploring, recognising. Wittgenstein’s most-quoted phrase, as I’ve said, is probably ‘to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life’. It is used in a variety of ways and lends itself to a variety of causes; Arthur Danto, for instance, uses it as a supposition to think through the implications a language without narrative predicates has for its people. The context of Wittgenstein’s statement is a language-game request, asking one to imagine ‘a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle’, or ‘a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering Yes and No’.