Summary

The main thesis of the book is that both vulgar religion and philosophical theism in Hume come with both negative and positive variations. The positive variant of philosophical theism is true religion. Vulgar superstition can be contrasted not only with philosophical theism but also with reformed or supervised popular religion. The essential points of this interpretation are as follows. Hume argues that philosophy, if not founded upon proper experimental methods and mitigated scepticism, could be mixed with and corrupted by vulgar religion. Hume’s criticism of religion includes an internal critique of the assumptions of early modern Christian natural theology (relying on an empiricist, Newtonian methodology), as well as, indirectly, a priori scholastic metaphysics. For Hume, religious doctrines cannot be justified by cogent philosophical arguments or scientific methodology. Hume links true religion with (true) philosophy, and his view of the ideal philosopher’s character is somewhat similar to the ideal of the ancient sceptics and stoics. True religion exemplifies true worship and the moral, intellectual virtues that institutional religion ought to manifest but, in practice, it cannot. Finally, for Hume, virtually all religions found in history have had deleterious effects, though they could have positive effects if they were moderated and regulated by philosophical criticism as well as government power. Hume’s supervised church is a religious institution constrained by the government for practical reasons and should be treated in a rather fictionalist and pragmatic manner. Hume’s conception of true religion can be taken as a genuine humanistic alternative to both various trends in early modern Christian philosophy and the radical secularist and militant atheism that culminated in the Enlightenment. It offers an intellectual and practical alternative to both materialistic atheism and traditional Christianity.