Against Negative Readings of ‘True Religion’

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of arguments against the negative reading (i.e. the ironic or insincere reading) and argues for the prima facie plausibility of Hume’s sincerity on true religion. First, by analysing textual and circumstantial evidence, it shall be argued that the case for Hume’s conformism is overstated. Although he was cautious when writing about religion, it is implausible that he was completely insincere, or deliberately misrepresented his own views. Insincerity would also be incompatible with Hume’s ideal of philosophy as an essentially truth-seeking activity. Second, the ironic-atheist reading of Hume’s affirmative, theistic passages appears to be underdeveloped or unfounded, because a coherent and plausible attribution of irony to a writer requires an explanation of when and why irony is being used. Finally, the chapter critically examines David Berman’s account of theological lying. It argues that his account is not supported by historical evidence and deploys a problematic methodology. Therefore, irony and insincerity concerning theism and religion should not be taken as the default position for responding to exegetical challenge of Hume’s use of ‘true religion’ and his affirmations of (minimal) theism.