Ramsey’s Test and Ramsey Tests

In this chapter, I compare the results of Chaps. 3 and 4 with some contemporary theories of conditionals. First, I suggest a reading of Ramsey’s footnote along the lines of the account outlined in the previous chapter. I propose a Ramsey test for the account of conditionals outlined in Chap. 4 and compare it with other Ramsey tests, when possible, or, more generally, with the guiding principles and consequences of relevant theories. I start with what I call ‘additional premises theories’ (Chisholm, Analysis 15(5):97–105, 1955, Goodman, J Philos 44(5), 113–128, 1947 , Rescher, Hypothetical reasoning. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. North-Holland Publishing Company, 1964 , Veltman, Amsterdam papers of formal grammar, 1 (pp. 248–281), 1976 and Kratzer, J Philosoph Logic 10(2), 201–216, 1981). Then, I turn to possible-world semantics, as developed by Stalnaker (Studies in logical theory (american philosophical quarterly monographs 2) (pp. 98–112). Blackwell, 1968) and Lewis (Counterfactuals. Blackwell, 1973), varying strict conditionals. Next, I consider probabilistic semantics that focus on indicative conditionals, focusing on Adams’ approach (Inquiry: Interdiscipl J Philos 8(1–4):166–197, 1965). I then discuss belief revision theories and the version of the Ramsey test proposed by Gädenfors (Am Philosoph Quart 18(3):203–211, 1981, Philosoph Rev 95(1):81–93, 1986). Lastly, I briefly discuss some recent developments in trivalent and relevance logics of conditionals, with which the present account shares some intuitions. This chapter shows that the account outlined in this work could be, once fully developed, an alternative to contemporary most attractive solutions, delivering similar results, and covering all types of conditionals.