The Extent of Dispositional Reality

In this chapter I will address two interconnected questions concerning the extent of Dispositional Reality vis-à-vis the overall structure of reality: firstly, what kind of dispositional predicates ought to be taken as joint-carving? While some candidates are excluded, the case for others is left open, and a tentative case for pluralism is made. Secondly, which true ascriptions of non-dispositional predicates are ultimately underpinned by Dispositional Reality? This is the distillate, within the context of my account, of the question: are all properties dispositional? My answer will be: no. While some non-dispositional ascriptions can be explained dispositionally, other ascriptions are resistant to this kind of treatment. On the present account there is no robust divide between dispositional and categorical properties, but the result still qualifies as a form of dualism: Dispositional Reality may be a vast region of metaphysical structure, but there is little reason to think that it exhausts it.