Dispositional Reality

This chapter introduces and discusses the concept of Dispositional Reality. To believe that there is Dispositional Reality is to believe that (at least some) dispositional talk is not merely true, but metaphysically perspicuous. Based on the metaphysical backdrop of the previous chapters, I will show that this dispositional aspect of reality is not a thing, and thus not a property of any kind. An explicitly nominalist version of the position is tentatively introduced. Furthermore, through the distinction between mere truths and perspicuous truths, the recent and much-discussed distinction between metaphysically innocent and metaphysically loaded dispositional talk will be deflated. More generally, this resulting power metaphysics without powers promises to deflate many problematic issues in recent literature, or reframe them in a more manageable fashion. This goes to show that at least some of these may be the result of an unduly reification of Dispositional Reality.