Reward Mobilisation and the Participation of Resource-Poor Citizens

This chapter focuses on reward mobilisation (electoral clientelism) as a potential explanation for the higher turnout of resource-poor individuals. The chapter argues and shows that electoral clientelism is prevalent in many parts of Africa. In this context, one would expect that all voters are exposed to and targeted by political parties/politicians regardless of their social status. Still, for various reasons, I contend that resource-poor people in Africa should be the main target for reward mobilisation. First, poverty and inequalities abound, with resource-poor people being subject to different risks and vulnerabilities. Moreover, the absence of a well-developed social welfare system to assist people in coping with these vulnerabilities implies that resource-poor are more exposed and should be targeted by reward mobilisation. Thus, the government's inability to protect citizens from vulnerability might pave the way for a vote-buying relationship between politicians and voters, which might then be used to mobilise electoral support. Drawing on three rounds of Afrobarometer survey data, the chapter interrogates and tests different mechanisms underpinning this argument.