Comment on A. Kern, “The Knowledge View of Perception”

Professor Kern’s “Knowledge View of Perception” discusses a “two-capacity view” of perceptual knowledge. Such a view distinguishes, in a way that Kern will ultimately oppose, between perception, on one hand, and the capacity for knowledge itself, on the other. Kern argues that on this account, perception cannot explain the transition constituted by the act of judgment. But I wonder whether there’s a coherent position on which although (i) the product of the exercise of our perceptual capacities does not close off the possibility that, for all we (then) know, an object could be otherwise than, in that perception, the object is in that way thought, nevertheless (ii) in our judgment, whose rationality is explained in part by its being based on that very perceptual experience, we then do knowledgeably rule that the object is as it is in that perception presented as being.