The Antagonism of Thomas Carlyle’s Romanticism and John Rawls’s Rationalism on Social and Distributive Justice

Thomas Carlyle and John Rawls each offer divergent forms of philosophical constructivism in their deliberations on social and distributive justice. Carlyle constructs an account of social justice from a social vantage point of alienation and omniscience in Sartor Resartus while Rawls constructs an account of social justice from a “veil of ignorance” as a social vantage point in A Theory of Justice. Such incommensurable premises yield incommensurable conclusions, whereby Carlyle prioritizes renunciation of otherwise insatiable consumer appetites as a means to achieve social solidarity while Rawls prioritizes the maximization of the satisfaction of basic needs. Carlyle’s conclusions parallel those of Aristotle. The dialogue of Carlyle and Rawls poses as a mutual test of each’s conceptions of justice and Carlyle informs a Romantic critique of Rawlsian liberalism that can be weighed alongside communitarian and libertarian critiques offered by Alasdair MacIntyre and Robert Nozick, respectively.