The Common Law Tradition

This Chapter argues that the scientia iuris categorisation that this book employs to unfold and contextualise the nature and operations of law as an intellectual artifact to be used for ordering purposes is not a prerogative of the Civilian mind-set. To the contrary, it has been shared by, and still defines and directs, the study and practice of law in the Common law tradition as well. A (by no means exhaustive) list of examples and directions of thought to support this claim was given in Chap. 2 . Taking one step farther, this Chapter outlines some brief, additional reflections on this pivotal theme. Particular attention is paid to the historical elaboration and employment of the notion of ‘artificial reason’ to legitimise the Common lawyers’ institutional functions and prerogatives. The Chapter concludes with an analysis of some influential views on the role of causal reasoning in judicial thinking—views which, the Chapter argues, corroborate the book’s argument regarding scientia iuris’ constructivist nature and working logic.