Pluralised Constituent Power in Two Nominal Federations: Ethiopia and Iraq

Most modern constitutions claim to derive their authority from the people of the nation. In theoretical terms, the people is said to be the “constituent power” on which the constitution is founded. However, federations pose a puzzle for this theory because they can often appear to be predicated on a plurality of “peoples” of the constituent states.  This chapter analyses the federal constitutions of Ethiopia and Iraq, the preambles of which attribute constituent power respectively to “the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia” and “the people of Mesopotamia” and “the people Iraq”, themselves said to be composed of a plurality of “nationalities, religions and sects”.  The chapter asks whether these statements reflect the political reality of the two countries. It is argued that in both cases the constitutional attributions of constituent power are in some important respects merely nominal in the sense that they express ideals that remain unrealised, and merely semantic in the sense that they are an outward formalization of existing political configurations for the benefit of present power-holders. As a consequence, the two constitutions appeal to an entirely inchohate people, or peoples, who can act only through institutions controlled by individuals claiming to act on their behalf. At the same time, the constituent people of the people(s) lurks in the background, posing a constant challenge to the stability of the constitutional settlement, often erupting in open conflict, especially in the case of Ethiopia. Because the substantial content of the two constitutions was, in fact, determined by forces endogenous to the people(s) upon whom the two constitutions were ostensibly founded, undermining their capacity to address conflict and division within the two countries.