Mitigating the Moral Hazards of Proxy Warfare

Moral hazards arise when sponsors and proxies can redistribute risk in ways that enable potentially harmful outcomes. This redistribution risks creating self-defeating incentives because one will not experience the full range of harms those risks entail. These incentives are self-defeating in at least two ways: (1) encouraging more risk-taking inappropriately expands the scope of the conflict and (2) taking those risks results in greater suffering or violations of moral norms. These hazards arise because sponsor and proxy interests, will, and capabilities often vary. These variations can lead to divergent interests and overly optimistic estimates about the actual cost of war that can drag both parties into a conflict they might otherwise have avoided. Even if one cannot prevent the conflict, introducing a proxy relationship can motivate others to join the fight, thus escalating it. Moreover, once the fighting has started, the proxy’s failure to abide by jus in bello norms can implicate the sponsor in war crimes and other atrocities. Finally, these moral hazards can impact well after the conflict is over as military equipment no longer needed for the fight diffuses into other militant and criminal hands, making conflict more likely or more brutal elsewhere.