What If We Lived in the Best of All Possible (Quantum) Worlds?
摘要
For scientific realists, quantum mechanics is unsatisfactory because it suffers from the measurement problem. However, there are at least three promising solutions: the pilot-wave theory, the many-worlds theory, and the theory of spontaneous collapse. In this paper I argue that the measurement problem is a false problem for the realist: it was proposed as the last resort to convince the positivists that the theory is not empirically adequate. Instead, realists should focus on preserving the reductive explanatory schema that had worked so well in physics before, which requires a theory to have a three-dimensional, microscopic ontology. Incompleteness argument to this effect have been proposed in the 1920s, but effectively ignored due to the positivistic climate, other unscientific reasons, and theorems which claimed that this project was impossible. When realists re-examined quantum mechanics in the 1950s and later, they happened to focus on the measurement problem. In this paper I speculate on what would have happened if realists instead focused on finding a three-dimensional, microscopic ontology to complete quantum theory. I show that most paradoxes, puzzles, and mysteries connected with quantum mechanics would have never emerged.