Limits of Trolley Problem Style Thought Experiments

In this chapter we raise further doubts about empirical work on the trolley problem, but focus more on the thought experiments on which the empirical work relies. We show how, in some cases, illegitimate stipulations are made which render unsound the conclusions some writers draw from trolley problem scenarios, (including some of the empirical work). Some attempts to respond to these problems do not work. We argue that many of Frances Kamm’s attempts to devise trolley scenarios to question solutions proposed by Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson are misguided, because they confuse counterexamples with borderline cases. We then suggest that the endless attempts to derive clever scenarios questioning the application of suggested moral principles simply have no implications for the cogency of the principles we already use to deal with real-life dilemmas. At best, they are relevant to a Lego set world vastly different from our own.