Taking the Evolutionary Psychological Elephant by the Tusks

We examine Jonathan Haidt’s claim that moral reasoning is largely conducted at the behest of our emotions or intuitions. On this view, moral reasoning is merely a PR company or spokesperson for moral positions already formed by the emotional centres in our brain. Its role is to rationalise, excuse, and to enable people to uphold their reputations. He applies his ‘Moral Foundations Theory’, the pillars of which are the tensions between care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation, and liberty/oppression, to explain why conservatives and liberals can never agree. We take issue with all these claims and with the ‘Moral Foundations Theory’ itself. We claim that, while there is no doubt some truth to some of Haidt’s claims, many of them are overstated. In developing the Theory he fails adequately to distinguish between religion and morality. This failure is ultimately fatal to the Theory. We also question the conclusions Haidt draws from two thought experiments (one related to incest, one to cannibalism), and point out fundamental flaws in the experiments. We consider the true nature of reasons and rationalisations, arguing that reason need only be the ground for, not the cause of, moral judgements.