Beginnings

Rape (for instance) is wrong. But conventional philosophical methods do not provide adequate reasons to justify the wrongness per se, let alone to reflect adequately the degree of wrongness. Rules such as ‘rape is wrong’ do not need philosophical justification: nor are they properly vulnerable to the sorts of criticisms commonly made in the course of a rigorous, conventional philosophical interrogation. Joshua Greene is committed to claiming that it is an open question whether or not rape is wrong. We disagree, but, importantly, disclaim the label ‘intuitionist’ if the label means that it is only by intuition that we know that rape is wrong. We enquire into the true nature of norms, and investigate the role of emotion in moral reasoning, contending that the old reason/emotion dualism is misconceived and morally dangerous. It involves pretending that we are disembodied brains in vats. A view of ourselves so divorced from the realities of human life is unlikely to produce good moral—or philosophically respectable—results.