Conclusion

Haidt, Greene and Singer agree that intuition is largely the driver of our moral judgements. Haidt argues that we have to accept this, but in his argument he caricatures both reason itself and the mechanics of reasoning. Greene does not agree that we have to accept the role of intuition in moral reasoning. We can and should learn to ignore our intuitions when facing the “unfamilar” challenges of our contemporary, technologically driven world. They were useful when we were evolving: they are now largely redundant. Singer agrees with Greene. We have charted a middle course between Haidt on the one hand and Greene and Singer on the other. We have done so by defending rational argument, reasoned persuasion and the role of evidence in changing attitudes. Singer relies on Street’s evolutionary debunking arguments: the result is that he rejects much commonsense morality. We debunk Street’s debunking, and Singer’s austere rationalism collapses. It is philosophically reputable to be commonsensically moral. Reason remains the ultimate arbiter of moral truth, but not in the way envisaged by Greene and Singer. Intuitions are already infused with rationality. Reason does not need to be the cause but only the ground of our moral judgements.