Realistic Trolleyology?

This chapter considers realistic versions of the trolley problem. These include the Zebrugge ferry disaster, and the story of a dilemma for Churchill in the war. The chapter offers a way of resolving these real dilemmas, and some imagined but realistic dilemmas. We discuss Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 2008 solution to the trolley problem. Whilst we broadly accept her solution, we criticise her approach to the well-known driver version. We argue that we should simply accept that this version is a borderline case between killing and letting die, and not try to characterise it as one or the other. We should live with the resultant moral uncertainty this creates. We then turn to the implications of our analysis for the role of intuitions in moral reasoning. Thomson’s claims about the Transplant case accord with what 90% of people believe to be morally true about that case. However, her conclusion about the bystander case (that the bystander is not permitted to turn the trolley) is at odds with what 90% of people typically conclude. How can we choose which intuitions to rely on? We reply that we do not rely on intuitions in the Transplant case, and so are not guilty of being selective about which intuitions are legitimate and which are not.