Introduction

This section identifies the insurgency fought in Dhofar, Oman, from 1963 to 1976 as an understudied topic in twentieth-century British and Middle Eastern history. The UK played an indirect but significant role in backing the Omani royal regime against the Dhofar revolt, and it is only following the declassification of British government archival sources that scholars can study Britain’s part in the Dhofar War in depth. The introduction outlines the core conclusions of the book, which are that the image of the conflict as a ‘population-centric’ counter-insurgency based around ‘hearts and minds’ is misplaced, and the defeat of the Dhofari insurgency depended more on the use of conventional military force. In addition, both the Conservative and Labour governments of the time were concerned that the conflict could escalate and that Britain would have to send combat troops to defeat the rebellion.