Appendix 1: How to Solve Hume’s Problem of Induction

The post-Newtonian view that evidence alone decides what theories are accepted in science fails to solve Hume’s problem of induction. But this Newtonian view is untenable in any case: in persistently accepting unified theories only, and ignoring endlessly many disunified rivals that fit available phenomena even better, physics thereby makes an implicit metaphysical assumption: the universe is such that all disunified theories are false. That refutes the post-Newtonian view of science. It is thus not surprising that the Newtonian view fails to solve Hume’s problem. But does aim-oriented empiricism do better? It does; it solves the problem. First, in acknowledging that physics makes a substantial, metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe, aim-oriented empiricism is more rigorous intellectually than all versions of its post-Newtonian rival. Secondly, the hierarchical structure of aim-oriented empiricism provides the best means for developing metaphysical assumptions of science that represent the nature of the universe in increasingly accurate and truth-like ways. Third, it is shown that Hume’s argument that there cannot be necessary connections between successive states of affairs is false. What exists now may well determine necessarily what exists in the future. We are justified in accepting the results of science.