The Post-Newtonian Blunder, and the Failure to Develop Aim-Oriented Empiricism

Modern science began as natural philosophy. Two ingredients are essential: first, the adoption of the metaphysical conjecture that the universe is such that phenomena obey mathematically precise laws; and secondly, a scrupulous concern to assess theories by means of observation and experiment (in addition to compatibility with the metaphysical conjecture). Both elements are to be found in the crucial work of Kepler and Galileo; and they are to be found in the first edition of Newton’s Principia too. But then, in response to criticism, Newton removed every hint of the conjectural and metaphysical from subsequent editions, and claimed dishonestly to have derived everything from phenomena by induction. As a result of Newton’s immense prestige, scientists after Newton came to take for granted versions of his inductivist conception of science. As a consequence, a wedge was driven between science and philosophy, to the detriment of both. That is the post-Newtonian blunder. Never corrected, it has devastatingly trivialized subsequent philosophy, in depriving it of contact with science and the world. We need to correct the post-Newtonian blunder, acknowledge that all versions of the Newtonian conception of science are untenable, implement aim-oriented empiricism, and transform science so that it becomes natural philosophy.