An Anti-jamming Game When None Player Knows Rival’s Channel Gain

We consider a user’s communication with a receiver in presence of a jammer, in the most competitive situation for user and jammer when they do not have access to complete information on channel gains of each other although they could have access to exact information on their own channel gains. The problem is modeled as a Bayesian power control game between user and jammer as players. Incomplete information is modeled as statistical data over possible channel gains (also referred as channel states). Since channel gain is a function on the distance to the receiver, this also covers scenarios where the user and jammer could know its own location via global positioning system (GPS), but none of them know the exact location of the other. A novel approach is suggested to derive equilibrium of such problems in closed form for two communication metrics: signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) metric, reflecting regular data transmission, and latency metric, reflecting emergency data transmission. In particular, it is shown that the user’s equilibrium strategies corresponding to the latency metric is more sensitive to the a priori statistical information, as compared to the SINR metric. This reflects an advantage of implementing latency metric in case of availability of exact information on network parameters, and an advantage of implementing SINR metric in case of lack of such its availability.