Interinstitutional Conflict in the Context of Leadership Appointment of the Commission

The selection of the European Commission President was shaped by the Spitzenkandidaten system in the last two appointment rounds. This chapter zooms into the interinstitutional dynamics between Council and Parliament in the two rounds of appointments. We show that the principle indeed increases interinstitutional conflict, yet, this does not lead to stalemate but rather a rebalancing to re-establish power-sharing. As the dual legitimating logic and interinstitutional power-sharing persist, the Spitzenkandidaten system may weaken rather than strengthen the EP’s position. The key finding is that the Spitzenkandidaten system suffers from a number of dilemmas: the more success it has in politicising the electoral campaigns, the more are the party groups in the EP under pressure to depoliticise immediately after the election to successfully instal an EP appointee in the interinstitutional conflict. In addition, rather than promoting the agenda of the institution that first selected the Commission president, the initial presidential agendas aimed to integrate the defeated institution’s political objectives—which further undermines the intended effect of the Spitzenkandidaten system to produce a politicisation along partisan politics, and instead strengthens the existing balance of power between the different institutions.