The European Council’s Electoral Power: The National Leaders as Driving Forces Behind EU Top-Level Appointments

The Spitzenkandidaten process initiated by the European Parliament for the 2014 European Parliament elections was bound to challenge the European Council’s electoral function. This analysis will consider the European Council’s role in electing the Commission President in the past and particularly since 2014. We argue that there is a path dependency in the procedure by which national leaders want to have a decisive say. Yet to explain the European Council’s role we need to put it in a broader context and widen the scope to focus on its electoral function in general and take into account the other top positions for which this key institution performs this function: the members always agree on their proposals in package deals linking the nomination of the President of the European Commission with those of the President of the European Council as well as the High Representative and, in 2019, also of the President of the European Central Bank. Our contribution will identify the criteria for the European Council’s agreements and analyse the political power battles that underpin them. It will also illustrate that the political leaders of the EU member states have no intention to reduce their powers in selecting the key personnel of the EU institutions referring to the legitimacy of their involvement. In addition, we will sketch out ways and procedures by which the European Council and the European Parliament are able to reach the necessary compromises concerning the selection of EU institution leaders.