Fiction

On the basis of an extensive discussion of previous research in the fields of linguistics, literary theory, and the philosophy of language, it will be argued that ‘fiction(ality)’ constitutes neither an ‘institution’ nor a ‘contract’, but a ‘convention’ according to the definition given by Lewis (Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge (MA) 1969, reprint 2002, 1969/2002). In a second step, a differentiation between signals of fiction(ality) and properties of fiction as well as between ‘reference’ and ‘referent’ is established that leads to the formulation of a first criterion of fiction(ality) defined as ‘reference without referent’ or ‘violation of ordinary language rules of presupposition’. The historical emergence of fiction(ality) is then attributed to yet another characteristic of natural languages—their deictic structure—that functions differently in oral and written communication, and that permits, in specific types of utterances, ‘situation-splitting’ as well as ‘open’ reference. This in turn allows us to formulate a second criterion, focusing on a specific disposition on the part of the recipient in the wake of Coleridge’s famous dictum of the willing suspension of disbelief. Furthermore, the relationship between ‘literature’ and ‘fiction(ality)’ is discussed and defined as a non-necessary, but privileged correlation, and finally the conceptual status of fiction(ality) is redefined in the context of prototype semantics.