Shifting Relations Between Islamic Non-State and State Actors in Turkey

Islam in Turkey and the core state apparatus albeit strictly secular have been always in strong interaction especially since the beginning of multiparty system in 1960 following which the Islamic movements have been translated in political parties. This chapter highlights the delicate dynamic between the state and Islamic activities since 1960s and explores how the core Turkish state apparatus -even though over the last two decades an Islamic leaning political regime has been in power-, does not allow deliberately emergence of any non-state Islamic actor that is not in line with the state's understanding of Islamism (in this case the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs).  The state actor Diyanet and non-state Islamic actors (e.g. Furkan Foundation, Salafi movements) have their own dynamics within the domestic politics and Diyanet aims to contain any Islamic actor's fortifying.  The current state's authoritarian reflex advocates the prevention of these non-state actors; however in doing this, Turkish state still corroborates with some other actors for sustaining of political regime. While in domestic arena, the state's authoritarian feature helps any reinforcing of non-wanted Islamic actors, in foreign milieu, the Turkish state apparatus attempts to reach out both Turkish and non-Muslim groups via the soft power of Diyanet. This chapter explores this complex relationships of Turkish state with non-state Islamic actors in both domestic and foreign milieu. In doing so, the chapter touches upon the secular opposition's reaction to both state and non-state Islamic actors in the country. In addition, the chapter also explores the European decision-makers' relationship with the Diyanet in line with their domestic and foreign policy perspective.