The Power-Sharing Arrangements in Iraq: The Instability Within

Consociational power-sharing arrangements were part of the political bargain between Iraqi elites and the Americans intended mainly to accommodate the Kurds’ desire for self-rule and the Shias’ desire for inclusion within a unified Iraq. When looking at Iraq’s power-sharing system, it is obvious that liberal consociationalism was favored by the constitutional designers to avoid problems associated with corporate consociation. However, liberal consociational power-sharing has not avoided the problems associated with corporate consociation and thereby lead to new instability. This chapter focuses on the sources of instability and exclusion by highlighting the absence of favorable factors for success, as well as some unfavorable outcomes of the power-sharing design. The chapter first explains the social structures of Iraqi society, then the current power-sharing arrangements covering the most recent developments in Iraq, and finally the identified sources of instability and exclusion.