Still the Dealmaker? The Council Presidency in EMU

The introduction of fixed term presidencies for the European Council and the Eurogroup had important institutional effects on the role of the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in European economic governance. This chapter explores these institutional effects and asks the following questions: did the fixed term presidencies change the role that the Council presidency previously played for the euro area? Who sets the agenda in European economic governance? Can national interests be pursued within the Council presidency or have such possibilities become circumscribed? We chose three moments of economic crisis and reform of economic governance to study the role that the presidencies played. First, we find that Herman Von Rompuy emerged as a key player in the fiscal and economic reforms negotiated in 2010 as president of the European Council. Second, in the case of BICC negotiations, Donald Tusk was not as important as the presidents of the Eurogroup. Lastly, the negotiations to establish a recovery mechanism after COVID-19 were dominated by Germany during its Council presidency leaving little space for Charles Michel to play a role as prominent as Herman Von Rompuy. While it is difficult to generalize, the creation of fixed term presidencies has eroded further the already questionable influence of the Council presidency in European economic governance, albeit not necessarily in a uniform way across time.