Typology/Population Distinction and Its Role in the Marginalization of Nineteenth-Century Non-Darwinian Theories in Modern Historiography

This article aims to deconstruct the division between typological and population thinking used by modern Darwinists, with a focus on examining the methodology employed to establish a connection between essentialism and typology. Specifically, the study analyzes the methods of two major proponents of this thesis: Ernst Mayr and David Hull. The typology/population dichotomy, initially proposed by Mayr, has significantly influenced the historical narrative surrounding the rise of non-Darwinian theories in the nineteenth century. However, this narrative oversimplifies the concept of species in non-Darwinian theories and reinforces the perceived link between Darwinism and the modern synthesis. By scrutinizing the methodology used by Hull and Mayr, it is crucial to assess the soundness of the methods employed to identify the influence of essentialism on nineteenth-century biology. This chapter’s aim is to examine the rationale behind their claims and the adequacy of the analysis built upon these assumptions. The goal is to determine whether the argument presented, supporting the division between “accurate” populational theories of evolution and “erroneous” typological ones, is sufficiently supported by evidence and justified by the methods employed by Mayr and Hull in their historiography. The deconstruction of this classic interpretation of non-Darwinian theories inherently challenges a specific interpretation of Darwinism that was popularized by Mayr and Hull. More specifically, it challenges the vision of Darwinism as the representation of “good” science, differing significantly from other evolutionary theories influenced by ancient essentialism.