Subject to Subjectivity: A Conceptual Shift in the Discourse on Self

The problem of the existence of self has been addressed in multiple ways across philosophical traditions. This chapter aims to look at some of the different ways in which the problem has been conceived within one particular strand of theorising about self, namely, the “Consciousness-based approach.” The defining feature of such a strand is that it takes consciousness as the locus of self. Contrary to this approach, there are various other accounts of self, offering responses to the problem of self which can be put under the broad category namely, the Non-conscious-based approach. The former approach was made explicit in the modern philosophy by David Hume’s attempt to address the issue, as this chapter argues. Hume ended up denying the existence of self as he failed to see an impression within his mind which conforms to the notion of self. However, Hume’s impact is so crucial as far as the consciousness-based approach is concerned since any similar account within this strand is liable to respond in some way or other to Hume’s. Responding to such a concern, some philosophers think that the nature of the problem demands some key shifts away from the Humean way of conceiving the problem in order to arrive at a strong affirmative account of self. This chapter identifies two such contemporary consciousness-based accounts such as the ones offered by Searle (Mind: A brief introduction. Oxford University Press, New York, 2004) and Zahavi and Kriegel (For-me-ness: what it is and what it is not. In: Dahlstrom DO, Elpidorou A, Hopp W (eds) Philosophy of mind and phenomenology: conceptual and empirical approaches, Routledge, London, pp 36–53, 2015) respectively. A major focus of this chapter is to examine how far both the accounts under consideration have moved away from Humean assumptions, how much are they close to Hume, both methodologically and conceptually, and are there any conceptual alterations that have happened down the line. Following a key conceptual shift which Zahavi and Kreigel advocate with regard to the nature of selfhood, that is from “subject” to “subjectivity” this chapter assumes that it would significantly reshape the question, where exactly to look for self within consciousness. By banking on this, this chapter offers a plausible distinction among the consciousness-based affirmative approach, between Formal feature-based account and Experience-based account of selfhood and argues that such a distinction is crucial to capture the apt locus of self. In contrast to this, the adoption of a purely Formal feature-based account towards the abovementioned problem may not help. The latter approach fails to capture the crucial relation between self and consciousness. Searle’s account is a typical example for this. Such a move falls short of tracking the exact nature of selfhood.