Narrative Construction of the Self and the Accuracy Problem

That narrative approach to the nature of the self and personal identity captures the insight that the experiences of a person are not independent, discrete mental episodes but can only exist as part of linking holistic structure. The narrative of oneself that one gradually constructs, in conjunction with others, provides that linking structure. Marya Schechtman (The Constitution of Selves. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996) places a reality constraint on self-narratives: they cannot be radically out of touch with reality. We cannot always just accept the content of a person’s self-narrative. But I resist Schechtman’s approach of distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable self-narratives, except there can be extreme cases where we scarcely can accept there is a self. I wish to preserve the hope that a narrative conception of the self can contribute to our understanding of personal identity through time. But my approach is not to focus on the content of the self-narrative but rather on the object that is the self-narrative. Tracing that object through time determines personal identity.