Rationality’s Precepts and Cognates (Irrational, Nonrational, Arational, etc.)

Now that we have established a viable, workable explanation of what rationality consists in, we can consider some of the related precepts and cognate notions within the proposal. To recap: The theory to the best explanation has successfully built upon the notion that an anthropological approach is critical in developing the hierarchical, multi-leveled theory of rationality as a longstanding cultural project. “In the field” (everyday life) one gathers potential precepts and assesses one against the other in terms of how one may pursue rationality as a cultural practice. Thus, rationality as a cultural project, the inquiry into rationality shifts from the philosophical to the anthropological. This project thereby involves a series of precepts in an empirical inquiry: What are these precepts needed in this project? In this kind of “ethnography,” 12 precepts for rationality are gathered—such as empirical epistemology, scientific skepticism, and autonomy of belief. These are offered for assessment of whether, via our intuitions as empirical researchers often do, they are appropriate for rationality in the sense derived in this essay. They remain open for further determination as to whether, given such precepts, they remain cogent. Given this firmer groundwork that the precepts provide, we can turn to the cognate terms of rationality and, given this stronger context for rationality, more sharply test just how it fits into our supposedly rational historic development and deployment of the concept.