Schelling continuously engaged with certain themes that can be located squarely in Plato’s dialogues—largely in the Timaeus, Philebus, and Meno, but also in the Republic, Ion, Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Symposium, Laws, and other works. Chief among such themes is Schelling’s grappling with dualities that are necessarily one and the same—as thetic terms that identify each other in their differentiation. These dualities emerge at the confluence of Schelling’s interests in myth and in his early studies of Plato, interests that are hardly mutually exclusive. Beginning at least in 1794 and extending to his Berlin lectures (1841–1846), Schelling never let go of what I would characterize as a Platonic gestalt. Especially in Schelling’s Timaeus Commentary, Schelling demonstrates how myth and productive opposition work together as a counter-explanation to the Kantian/Reinholdian/Fichtean positions each grounded in a particular first position. Plato’s Timaeus is Plato’s only work on natural philosophy and, not by coincidence, is told only as a story (μῦθος, mythos). Schelling shows us in his notes on this work, as Plato had shown him, that myth opens us up to possibilities for explanation beyond reason. Despite that Schelling is often called a protean thinker, this Platonic inheritance can be seen throughout the many stages and themes of his life’s work.

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Schelling & Plato

  • Chelsea C. Harry

摘要

Schelling continuously engaged with certain themes that can be located squarely in Plato’s dialogues—largely in the Timaeus, Philebus, and Meno, but also in the Republic, Ion, Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Symposium, Laws, and other works. Chief among such themes is Schelling’s grappling with dualities that are necessarily one and the same—as thetic terms that identify each other in their differentiation. These dualities emerge at the confluence of Schelling’s interests in myth and in his early studies of Plato, interests that are hardly mutually exclusive. Beginning at least in 1794 and extending to his Berlin lectures (1841–1846), Schelling never let go of what I would characterize as a Platonic gestalt. Especially in Schelling’s Timaeus Commentary, Schelling demonstrates how myth and productive opposition work together as a counter-explanation to the Kantian/Reinholdian/Fichtean positions each grounded in a particular first position. Plato’s Timaeus is Plato’s only work on natural philosophy and, not by coincidence, is told only as a story (μῦθος, mythos). Schelling shows us in his notes on this work, as Plato had shown him, that myth opens us up to possibilities for explanation beyond reason. Despite that Schelling is often called a protean thinker, this Platonic inheritance can be seen throughout the many stages and themes of his life’s work.