Sheriff: Between Economic Interest and Political Necessity

Whereas the World Bank paper by Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (“Seize the state, seize the day:” state capture, corruption, and influence in transition. Policy research working paper #2444. The World Bank & the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/537461468766474836/pdf/multi-page.pdf , 2000), often attributed as the source of the term “state capture,” usefully defined it as a situation where “some firms [are] able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage” by buying “rent-generating advantages” from a systemically corrupt state’s officials, in later usage, the term has been applied more broadly to economic, criminal or other actors capturing control of public offices and policies. The chapter considers the Sheriff Company’s rise, in the separatist Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, as a peculiar case of state capture, where a de facto state has come under controlling influence in the so-called “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic” (PMR). The underlying processes – the story of the expansion of the Sheriff conglomerate – were driven by the needs, vulnerabilities and opportunities stemming from the PMR’s de facto status and resulted in near-complete capture that compels the controlling economic actor (Sheriff) to act with considerations beyond a profit motive. Besides tracing the emergence of this outcome, the chapter offers reflection on the consequent implications for Moldova and for East–West relations at large.