The shift to a high-intensity conflict in Ukraine in February 2022 did not produce a massive change in the state of cyber-operations, fueling disappointment among observers who had been convinced of the emergence of a cyber-Pearl Harbor. Instead, cyber-capabilities remained under-used, confirming mutual restraint in cyberspace. Explanations of this mutual restraint can be thought of in terms of “incapacity,” “immaturity,” or “invisibility,” notions that will be debated in this article. However, reducing our analysis to a “Nothing happened” in terms of cyber-operations in this conflict would be deceptive. We argue here that this mutual restraint shall be understood as “relative,” resulting from the nature of cyber combined with a political immaturity of the actors to display the cyber tool. For that purpose, we decided to take for example the sector of electricity in Ukraine from February 2022 to nowadays, the most vulnerable sector according to European legislation.