This chapter sheds light on the relationship of Cowles planning (market socialist) and Chicago neoliberalism (pro-free market) by examining representatives of each, Kenneth Arrow and Ronald Coase, and by focusing on how each understood patents and public goods in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The topic of patents is a vast and intricate one; this chapter primarily focuses on the general attitudes. The concept of public goods basically means a good that will not be adequately supplied through markets, and hence government intervention is necessary to provide the good. Cowles planning and Chicago neoliberalism met at RAND during the Cold War. The fact Cowles planning was at RAND would have brought tremendous and grave concern to the Chicago neoliberals. They had to be countervailed. Their intellectual contest at RAND centered on the post-Sputnik concerns about the military technologies of the United States relative to those of the USSR. Both Arrow and Coase expressed serious concerns about this. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, research and development was a crucial policy issue, which frequently focused on how the United States should keep pace technologically with the Soviet Union. Should the United States rely primarily on the market for technological advancement? Or should it rely primarily on government interventions? In the post-Sputnik Cold War context, assessing the relative importance of patents for inventive activity and determining whether scientific research constituted a public good was a paramount concern. Arrow maintained that patents hindered inventive activity and claimed research was a public good, and hence, that government intervention had to play an important role in the research and development process. Coase, on the other hand, suggested that patents fostered invention and that research was not a public good; consequently, government intervention had a negligible role to play in the research and development process. This chapter argues that the Chicago neoliberal conclusions of Coase undermined the interests of RAND, while the Cowles planning conclusions of Arrow furthered the interests of RAND. However, it goes further in saying that the Chicago neoliberal conclusions of Coase sought to challenge Arrow because the market socialist thought of Cowles planning was dangerous for individual freedom. Chicago neoliberalism did so by claiming that the fundamental problem was not competition or free enterprise but rather the challenge of creating bundles of property rights for exchange. If bundles of property rights were exchangeable, then the market had an opportunity to allocate resources to their highest valued uses. There was no such thing as a market failure.

A Way Economics Engaged in Building Empire and Altered the World

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发表日期：

2026年

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Robert Van Horn

摘要

This chapter sheds light on the relationship of Cowles planning (market socialist) and Chicago neoliberalism (pro-free market) by examining representatives of each, Kenneth Arrow and Ronald Coase, and by focusing on how each understood patents and public goods in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The topic of patents is a vast and intricate one; this chapter primarily focuses on the general attitudes. The concept of public goods basically means a good that will not be adequately supplied through markets, and hence government intervention is necessary to provide the good. Cowles planning and Chicago neoliberalism met at RAND during the Cold War. The fact Cowles planning was at RAND would have brought tremendous and grave concern to the Chicago neoliberals. They had to be countervailed. Their intellectual contest at RAND centered on the post-Sputnik concerns about the military technologies of the United States relative to those of the USSR. Both Arrow and Coase expressed serious concerns about this. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, research and development was a crucial policy issue, which frequently focused on how the United States should keep pace technologically with the Soviet Union. Should the United States rely primarily on the market for technological advancement? Or should it rely primarily on government interventions? In the post-Sputnik Cold War context, assessing the relative importance of patents for inventive activity and determining whether scientific research constituted a public good was a paramount concern. Arrow maintained that patents hindered inventive activity and claimed research was a public good, and hence, that government intervention had to play an important role in the research and development process. Coase, on the other hand, suggested that patents fostered invention and that research was not a public good; consequently, government intervention had a negligible role to play in the research and development process. This chapter argues that the Chicago neoliberal conclusions of Coase undermined the interests of RAND, while the Cowles planning conclusions of Arrow furthered the interests of RAND. However, it goes further in saying that the Chicago neoliberal conclusions of Coase sought to challenge Arrow because the market socialist thought of Cowles planning was dangerous for individual freedom. Chicago neoliberalism did so by claiming that the fundamental problem was not competition or free enterprise but rather the challenge of creating bundles of property rights for exchange. If bundles of property rights were exchangeable, then the market had an opportunity to allocate resources to their highest valued uses. There was no such thing as a market failure.