(Counter)Positions of the Advocate General in His Opinions in the Cases RRC Sports, Rogon and Tondela in the Light of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s Case Law on Football
摘要
This chapter examines the Advocate General’s Opinions in RRC Sports, Rogon and Tondela against the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) evolving case law on football. It argues that these Opinions tend to broaden football federations’ regulatory powers, particularly over economic activities “peripheral” to sport such as intermediary services, by relying heavily on the Meca-Medina framework and, at times, conflating two distinct inquiries: (1) a federation’s standing, grounded in its statutes, to regulate a given activity, and (2) the compatibility of that regulation with EU law. By comparing these Opinions with Bosman, International Skating Union, Super League, Antwerp, Diarra, and Piau, the chapter contends that the CJEU has consistently moved toward constraining the discretionary power of football federations through robust substantive and procedural safeguards designed to prevent arbitrariness, particularly in matters affecting access to the football market, such as licensing and participation rules. The analysis further identifies Tondela as a decision on an exceptional pandemic-related no-poach arrangement which, despite its restrictive character, meets the Meca-Medina criteria owing to its narrowly tailored scope, temporary duration, and legitimate objective of safeguarding the fairness and integrity of competition. The chapter concludes that maintaining coherence with settled case law likely requires the CJEU to resist relying on Meca-Medina to justify standing, assess FIFA’s powers strictly by reference to its constitutional documents, and insist that any competition-restrictive measures meet rigorous necessity, proportionality and due-process requirements.