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<p>Recently, the concept of committing message authentication codes (MACs) was proposed at Crypto 2024, following the definition of committing authenticated encryption (AE). A secure committing MAC requires that it is infeasible for any adversary to find two different key and message pairs that generate the same tag. In this paper, we present committing attacks against PMAC, LightMAC, and UMAC, demonstrating that these MACs are not CMT secure. We also provide a CMT-K security proof for UMAC. Furthermore, we introduce two general methods for constructing one-key and two-key MACs with CMT-K security.</p>

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On committing security of PMAC, LightMAC, and UMAC

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月10日

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  • Yan Jia,
  • Xueqi Zhu,
  • Peng Wang,
  • Lei Hu

摘要

Recently, the concept of committing message authentication codes (MACs) was proposed at Crypto 2024, following the definition of committing authenticated encryption (AE). A secure committing MAC requires that it is infeasible for any adversary to find two different key and message pairs that generate the same tag. In this paper, we present committing attacks against PMAC, LightMAC, and UMAC, demonstrating that these MACs are not CMT secure. We also provide a CMT-K security proof for UMAC. Furthermore, we introduce two general methods for constructing one-key and two-key MACs with CMT-K security.